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Wednesday, October 14, 2009
Gradually the complexity and boldness of the Taliban raid on GHQ is being exposed – somewhat quicker than usual for these events, which is a welcome relief from the smokescreen that usually surrounds them. The operation was planned not in southern Punjab as speculated by many, but in South Waziristan. The attackers sought to take hostage senior officers and use them as leverage to gain the release of up to 100 of their comrades in arms, demand the trial of General Musharraf and an end to American use of our airbases. Whilst most of the population would not accede to their demands for the release of their comrades, there is probably a majority of the population who would support their call for an end to American use of our bases and the drone strikes, with perhaps a smaller proportion wanting to see Musharraf tried. It is also clear that there was some element of electronic intercept of the conversations between the various components of the assault group. On the morning of the attack a conversation between TTP commander Waliur Rehman and 'another person' revealed that the attack had its origins in South Waziristan and that this person was asked to 'pray for the Fedayeen attacking the GHQ'. If nothing else this suggests that our ability to conduct elint operations has advanced and would seem effective. It would not seem to be matched by capacity of the humint side of the equation that would allow the marrying of human and electronic intelligence into a real-time actionable picture. The much-vexed matter of whether there had been a security lapse was sidestepped by the adroit footwork of DG ISPR Maj-Gen Athar Abbas. He said that the terrorists achieved less than 10 per cent of their objectives, that the majority were stopped at the perimeter and that the army response as the siege developed was both appropriate and timely, taking into account the need to preserve the lives of the hostages. It was announced that a further three SSG commandos had died of their wounds overnight bringing the military death toll to 14; with nine terrorists killed and one captured – a ratio that will bring little comfort to the military high command.
However the event is dressed up by the government and the military itself, this is a huge embarrassment that is not going to fade quickly. A group of well-armed and well-trained men were able to fight and spoof their way into the heart of the military command structure. They sowed confusion with their camouflage and exploited their knowledge of the layout of the building they were attacking. Their reconnaissance and intelligence were good enough for the job in hand and they had logistical support in place around the area of operations. Once again we have to stress the competence of the enemy we face. Because of their very unconventionality they appear to be somehow 'less able' than more conventional forces, but this is a dangerous assumption. Events of last Saturday and Sunday morning should be proof enough of that. There is a flexibility and adaptability about the way in which the way the Taliban conduct their war-fighting that suits both terrain and context well. They have moved into the cities, spread into the countryside and over many years developed an infrastructure and base of 'fellow-traveller support' that grants them concealment. They have moved into higher education and created a cadre of highly-educated ideologues who will be their downstream planners, commanders – and scientists, the weapons developers of the future. They have become the enemy that is both within and without. Never underestimate them.
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ISSN 1563-9479 
